Main Conference
Contributed posters (see the Poster CFP) will be presented at the main conference main conference (July 7-12). Posters will be on display in the Main Hall in the afternoons and the authors will present their posters in the afternoon tea breaks. The posters are divided into four groups by day. Enjoy the tea, cakes, and posters.
Sunday, July 9
Fair Notification Optimization: An Auction Approach
Christian Kroer, Deeksha Sinha, Xuan Zhang, Shiwen Cheng, Ziyu Zhou, Xuan Zhang
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
Sequential Elimination Contests with All-Pay Auctions
Fupeng Sun, Yanwei Sun, Chiwei Yan, Li Jin
Information Goods: Externality-Based Upgrades and Income Effects
Ludwig Dierks, Makoto Yokoo
High Welfare Matching Markets via Descending Price
Robin Bowers, Bo Waggoner
Autobidders with Budget and ROI Constraints: Efficiency, Regret, and Pacing Dynamics
Brendan Lucier, Sarath Pattathil, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Mengxiao Zhang
Greedy Transaction Fee Mechanisms for (Non-)myopic Miners
Yotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish
Pay to (Not) Play: Monetizing Impatience in Mobile Games
Taylor Lundy, Narun Raman, Hu Fu, Kevin Leyton-Brown
Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes
Yoav Gal Tzur, Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman
Monday, July 10
Allocating Emission Permits Efficiently via Uniform Linear Mechanisms
Xingyu Lin, Jiaqi Lu
Mobility Data in Operations: The Facility Location Problem
Ozan Candogan, Yiding Feng
Loss Functions for Behavioral Game Theory
Greg d’Eon, Sophie Greenwood, Kevin Leyton-Brown, James Wright
Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Fair Markovian Search
Mohammad Reza Aminian, Vahideh Manshadi, Rad Niazadeh
On the Complexity of Maximizing Social Welfare within Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods
Xiaolin Bu, Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu, Jiaxin Song, Biaoshuai Tao
Polynomial-Time Optimal Equilibria with a Mediator in Extensive-Form Games
Brian Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm
Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities
David Pennock, Ariel Schvartzman, Eric Xue
Equilibrium and Learning in Fixed-Price Data Markets with Externality
Safwan Hossain, Yiling Chen
Tuesday, July 11
Off-Policy Learning of Content Promotions: Optimal Curation of Digital Distribution Channels
Joel Persson, Stefan Feuerriegel, Cristina Kadar
Near-Optimal Prior-Independent Online Algorithms and the Ski-Rental Problem
Jason Hartline, aleck johnsen, Anant Shah
Better Peer Grading through Bayesian Inference
Hedayat Zarkoob, Greg d’Eon, Lena Podina, Kevin Leyton-Brown
Operationalizing Counterfactual Metrics: Incentives, Ranking, and Information Asymmetry
Serena Wang, Stephen Bates, P. M. Aronow, Michael Jordan
On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka
1-epsilon Price of Anarchy for Public Projects with Quadratic Voting
Mary Monroe, Bo Waggoner
Fair Allocation in Crowd-Sourced Systems
Mishal Assif Poovan Kavil, William Kennedy, Iraj Saniee
Spatial Matching under Resource Competition
Alireza Amanihamedani, Daniel Freund, Ali Aouad
Multitask Peer Prediction With Task-dependent Strategies
Yichi Zhang, Grant Schoenebeck
Wednesday, July 12
Forecasting Competitions with Correlated Events
Rafael Frongillo, Manuel Lladser, Anish Thilagar, Bo Waggoner
Information Elicitation in Agency Games
Serena Wang, Michael Jordan, Katrina Ligett, Preston McAfee
Steering No-Regret Learners to Optimal Equilibria
Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen McAleer, Andreas Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Gabriele Farina
Certification Design for a Competitive Market
Andreas Haupt, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier
The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games
Emanuel Tewolde, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer, Paul W. Goldberg
Private Information Learning, Exploitation, and Manipulation
Yurong Chen
Meta-Learning in Games
Keegan Harris