Papers are available in the digital library:
- Reputation Effects under Short Memories
Harry Pei (Northwestern University) - Superiority of Instantaneous Decisions in Thin Dynamic Matching Markets
Johannes Bäumler (Technical University of Munich); Martin Bullinger (Technical University of Munich); Stefan Kober (Technical University of Munich); Donghao Zhu (Technical University of Munich) - Withholding Verifiable Information
Kun Zhang (Arizona State University) - Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling
Sepehr Assadi (Rutgers University); Vikram Kher (University of Southern California); George Li (University of Maryland); Ariel Schvartzman (Google Research) - Leveraging Reviews: Learning to Price with Buyer and Seller Uncertainty
Wenshuo Guo (UC Berkeley); Nika Haghtalab (UC Berkeley); Kirthevasan Kandasamy (UW Madison); Ellen Vitercik (Stanford University) - Which Lp norm is the fairest? Approximations for fair facility location across all “p”
Swati Gupta (Georgia Tech); Jai Moondra (Georgia Tech); Mohit Singh (Georgia Tech) - Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation
Hanrui Zhang (Carnegie Mellon University); Yu Cheng (Brown University); Vincent Conitzer (Carnegie Mellon University) - Graphon Games with Multiple Nash Equilibria: Analysis and Computation
Kiran Rokade (Cornell University); Francesca Parise (Cornell University) - Which wage distributions are consistent with statistical discrimination?
Rahul Deb (University of Toronto); Ludovic Renou (Queen Mary University of London) - Phase Transitions in Learning and Earning under Price Protection Guarantee
Qing Feng (Cornell University); Ruihao Zhu (Cornell University); Stefanus Jasin (University of Michigan) - Multi-agent Delegated Search
Suho Shin (University of Maryland); Keivan Rezaei (University of Maryland); MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi (University of Maryland) - Prizes and effort in contests with private information
Sumit Goel (California Institute of Technology) - Drivers of Digital Attention: Evidence from a Social Media Experiment
Guy Aridor (Northwestern University) - Optimal Indirect Regulation of Externalities
Zi Yang Kang (Stanford University) - The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Design
Banghua Zhu (University of California, Berkeley); Stephen Bates (University of California, Berkeley); Zhuoran Yang (Yale University); Yixin Wang (University of Michigan); Jiantao Jiao (University of California, Berkeley); Michael I. Jordan (University of California, Berkeley) - Choice Architecture, Privacy Valuations, and Selection Bias in Consumer Data
Tesary Lin (Boston University); Avner Strulov-Shlain (University of Chicago) - A General Framework for Fair Allocation under Matroid Rank Valuations
Vignesh Viswanathan (University of Massachusetts, Amherst); Yair Zick (University of Massachusetts Amherst) - A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling
Xin Huang (Technion); Erel Segal-Halevi (Ariel university) - The Economics of Recommender Systems: Evidence from a Field Experiment on MovieLens
Guy Aridor (Northwestern University); Duarte Goncalves (University College London); Daniel Kluver (University of Minnesota – Twin Cities); Ruoyan Kong (University of Minnesota – Twin Cities); Joseph Konstan (University of Minnesota – Twin Cities) - Principal Trading Arrangements: Optimality under Temporary and Permanent Price Impact
Markus Baldauf (University of British Columbia); Christoph Frei (University of Alberta); Joshua Mollner (Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management) - Agreement Implies Accuracy for Substitutable Signals
Rafael Frongillo (University of Colorado Boulder); Eric Neyman (Columbia University); Bo Waggoner (U. Colorado, Boulder) - Robust Stackelberg Equilibria
Jiarui Gan (University of Oxford); Minbiao Han (University of Chicago); Jibang Wu (University of Chicago); Haifeng Xu (University of Chicago) - The Wisdom of Strategic Voting
Qishen Han (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute); Grant Schoenebeck (University of Michigan); Biaoshuai Tao (Shanghai Jiao Tong University); Lirong Xia (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) - Information Design of a Delegated Search
Yangge Xiao (Institute of Operations Research and Analytics, National University of Singapore); Zhenyu Hu (NUS Business School, National University of Singapore,); Shouqiang Wang (Naveen Jindal School of Management, The University of Texas at Dallas) - Purchase History and Product Personalization
Laura Doval (Columbia University); Vasiliki Skreta (University of Texas at Austin) - Equitable stable matchings under modular assessment
KEMAL YILDIZ (BILKENT UNIVERSITY AND PRINCETON UNIVERSITY); AHMET ALKAN (SABANCI UNIVERSITY) - Fair Multiwinner Elections with Allocation Constraints
Ivan-Aleksandar Mavrov (Duke University); Kamesh Munagala (Duke University); Yiheng Shen (Duke University) - Description Complexity of Regular Distributions
Renato Paes Leme (Google Research); Balasubramanian Sivan (Google Research); Yifeng Teng (Google Research); Pratik Worah (Google Research) - Prophet Inequality: Order selection beats random order
Archit Bubna (Indian Institute of Technology Delhi); Ashish Chiplunkar (Indian Institute of Technology Delhi) - Finding the Right Curve: Optimal Design of Constant Function Market Makers
Mohak Goyal (Stanford University); Geoffrey Ramseyer (Stanford University); Ashish Goel (Stanford University); David Mazieres (Stanford University) - Location Choice, Commuting, and School Choice
Dong Woo Hahm (University of Southern California); Minseon Park (University of Wisconsin-Madison) - On the Timing of Auctions: The Effects of Complementarities on Bidding, Participation, and Welfare
Alex P. Arsenault-Morin (Queen’s University); Hayri Alper Arslan (University of Texas at San Antonio); Matthew L. Gentry (Florida State University) - A Measure of Complexity for Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Lea Nagel (Stanford University); Roberto Saitto (Stanford University) - Ambiguous Contracts
Paul Duetting (Google Research); Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University); Daniel Peretz (Tel Aviv University) - Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection
Javier Cembrano (Technische Universität Berlin); Felix Fischer (Queen Mary University of London); Max Klimm (Technische Universität Berlin) - Pricing Novel Goods
Francesco Giovannoni (University of Bristol); Toomas Hinnosaar (University of Nottingham) - Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity
Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research); Shahar Dobzinski (Weizmann Institute of Science); Ron Kupfer (Harvard University) - Robust Contracts: A Revealed Preference Approach
Nemanja Antic (Northwestern University); George Georgiadis (Northwestern University) - The Optimality of Constant Mark-Up Pricing
Dirk Bergemann (Yale); Tibor Heumann (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile); Stephen Morris (MIT) - Guaranteeing Envy-Freeness under Generalized Assignment Constraints
Siddharth Barman (Indian Institute of Science); Arindam Khan (Indian Institute of Science); Sudarshan Shyam (Aarhus University); K. V. N. Sreenivas (Indian Institute of Science) - Pandora’s Problem with Combinatorial Cost
Ben Berger (Tel Aviv University); Tomer Ezra (Sapienza University of Rome); Michal Feldman (Tel Aviv University); Federico Fusco (Sapienza University of Rome) - Multi-Item Order Fulfillment Revisited: LP Formulation and Prophet Inequality
Ayoub Amil (Duke University); Ali Makhdoumi (Duke University); Yehua Wei (Duke University) - Estimating Effects of Long-Term Treatments
Shan Huang (The University of Hong Kong); Chen Wang (The University of Hong Kong); Yuan Yuan (Purdue University); Jinglong Zhao (Boston University); Penglei Zhao (Tencent) - Causal Estimation of User Learning in Personalized Systems
Evan Munro (Stanford University); David Jones (Google); Jennifer Brennan (Google Research); Roland Nelet (Google Research); Vahab Mirrokni (Google Research); Jean Pouget-Abadie (Google Research) - Quantum Information Elicitation
Rafael M. Frongillo (University of Colorado Boulder) - Single-Leg Revenue Management with Advice
Santiago Balseiro (Columbia University); Christian Kroer (Columbia University); Rachitesh Kumar (Columbia University) - Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk
Ronen Gradwohl (Ariel University); Itai Arieli (Technion); Rann Smorodinsky (Technion) - Order-optimal Correlated Rounding for Fulfilling Multi-item E-commerce Orders
Will Ma (Columbia University) - Multi-Channel Auction Design in the Autobidding World
Andres Perlroth (Google); Gagan Aggarwal (Google Research); Junyao Zhao (Stanford) - A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice Mechanisms
Aram Grigoryan (University of California, San Diego); Markus Möller (University of Bonn) - Welfare-Maximizing Pooled Testing
Simon Finster (CREST-ENSAE); Michelle González Amador (UNU-MERIT & Maastricht University); Edwin Lock (University of Oxford); Francisco Marmolejo Cossio (Harvard University); Evi Micha (University of Toronto); Ariel Procaccia (Harvard University) - Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions
Itai Arieli (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology); Yakov Babichenko (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology); Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology); Konstantin Zabarnyi (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology) - Robust Auction Design with Support Information
Jerry Anunrojwong (Columbia Business School); Santiago R. Balseiro (Columbia Business School); Omar Besbes (Columbia Business School) - The Impact of Privacy Protection on Online Advertising Markets
Miguel Alcobendas (Yahoo Research); Shunto Kobayashi (Caltech); Ke Shi (Caltech); Matthew Shum (Caltech) - Computing Bayes Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual Averaging
Martin Bichler (Technical University of Munich); Maximilian Fichtl (Technical University of Munich); Matthias Oberlechner (Technical University of Munich) - No-Regret Learning in Games is Turing Complete
Gabriel P. Andrade (University of Colorado Boulder); Rafael Frongillo (University of Colorado Boulder); Georgios Piliouras (SUTD) - Confidence and College Applications: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention
Rustamdjan Hakimov (University of Lausanne); Renke Schmacker (University of Lausanne); Camille Terrier (Queen Mary University London) - Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives
Isa Hafalir (UTS); Fuhito Kojima (University of Tokyo); M. Bumin Yenmez (Boston College) - A Rational Inattention Theory of Echo Chamber
Lin Hu (Australian National University); Anqi Li (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University); Xu Tan (University of Washington) - Deep Learning Based Casual Inference for Large-Scale Combinatorial Experiments: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Zikun Ye (University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign); Zhiqi Zhang (Washington University in St. Louis); Dennis J. Zhang (Washington University in St. Louis); Heng Zhang (Arizona State University); Renyu Zhang (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) - Extreme Points of First-Order Stochastic Dominance Intervals: Theory and Applications
Kai Hao Yang (Yale University); Alexander Zentefis (Yale University) - Axioms for Constant Function Market Makers
Jan Christoph Schlegel (City, University of London); Mateusz Kwaśnicki (Wroclaw University of Science and Technology); Akaki Mamageishvili (Offchain Labs) - Competition and Specificity in Marketplace Design: Evidence from Geotargeted Ads
Bo Cowgill (Columbia University); Cosmina Dorobantu (Alan Turing Institute, London, UK) - Distortion Under Public-Spirited Voting
Bailey Flanigan (Carnegie Mellon University); Ariel Procaccia (Harvard University); Sven Wang (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) - Robust Pseudo-Markets for Reusable Public Resources
Siddhartha Banerjee (Cornell University); Giannis Fikioris (Cornell University); Eva Tardos (Cornell University) - Adwords with Unknown Budgets and Beyond
Rajan Udwani (UC Berkeley) - Incentive Compatibility in the Auto-bidding World
Yeganeh Alimohammadi (Stanford University); Aranyak Mehta (Google); Andres Perlroth (Google) - Adaptive Algorithms and Collusion via Coupling
Martino Banchio (Stanford University); Giacomo Mantegazza (Stanford University) - Interviewing Matching in Random Markets
Maxwell Allman (Stanford University); Itai Ashlagi (Stanford University) - Corporate Culture and Organizational Fragility
Matthew Elliott (Cambridge University); Benjamin Golub (Northwestern); Mathieu V. Leduc (Paris School of Economics / Université Paris 1) - Balanced Donor Coordination
Felix Brandt (Technical University of Munich); Matthias Greger (Technical University of Munich); Erel Segal-Halevi (Ariel University, Israel); Warut Suksompong (National University of Singapore) - Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets
Itai Ashlagi (Stanford University); Mark Braverman (Princeton University); Geng Zhao (University of California, Berkeley) - How Likely A Coalition of Voters Can Influence A Large Election?
Lirong Xia (RPI) - Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Markets: Theory and Applications to Electricity Markets
Mete Şeref Ahunbay (Technical University of Munich); Martin Bichler (Technical University of Munich); Johannes Knörr (Technical University of Munich) - Allocating with Priorities and Quotas: Algorithms, Complexity, and Dynamics
Siddhartha Banerjee (Cornell University); Matthew Eichhorn (Cornell University); David Kempe (University of Southern California) - Tightness without Counterexamples: A New Approach and New Results for Prophet Inequalities
Jiashuo Jiang (the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology); Will Ma (Columbia University); Jiawei Zhang (NYU Stern School of Business) - The Power of Menus in Contract Design
Guru Guruganesh (Google Research); Jon Schneider (Google); Joshua Wang (Google); Junyao Zhao (Stanford) - Prophet Secretary Against the Online Optimal
Paul Duetting (Google Research); Evangelia Gergatsouli (University of Wisconsin – Madison); Rojin Rezvan (University of Texas at Austin); Yifeng Teng (Google Research); Alexandros Tsigonias-Dimitriadis (Universidad de Chile) - Signaling Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Omar Besbes (Columbia University); Yuri Fonseca (Columbia University); Ilan Lobel (NYU); Fanyin Zheng (Columbia University) - Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices
Ido Bright (Lyft); Arthur Delarue (Georgia Tech); Ilan Lobel (NYU) - Best of Both Distortion Worlds
Vasilis Gkatzelis (Drexel University); Mohamad Latifian (University of Toronto); Nisarg Shah (University of Toronto) - Distortion in metric matching with ordinal preferences
Nima Anari (Stanford University); Moses Charikar (Stanford University); Prasanna Ramakrishnan (Stanford University) - Prophet Inequalities over Time
Andreas Abels (RWTH Aachen University); Elias Pitschmann (University of Bremen); Daniel Schmand (University of Bremen) - Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions
Yannai A. Gonczarowski (Harvard University); Ori Heffetz (Cornell University, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and NBER); Clayton Thomas (Princeton University) - The Limit of the Marginal Distribution Model in Consumer Choice
Yanqiu Ruan (Singapore University of Technology and Design); Xiaobo Li (National University of Singapore); Karthyek Murthy (Singapore University of Technology and Design); Karthik Natarajan (Singapore University of Technology and Design) - Measurement Integrity in Peer Prediction: A Peer Assessment Case Study
Noah Burrell (University of Michigan); Grant Schoenebeck (University of Michigan) - Strong Revenue (Non-)Monotonicity of Single-parameter Auctions
Ziyun Chen (Tsinghua University); Zhiyi Huang (The University of Hong Kong); Dorsa Majdi (Sharif University of Technology); Zipeng Yan (The University of Hong Kong) - Tâtonnement in Homothetic Fisher Markets
Denizalp Goktas (Brown University); Jiayi Zhao (Pomona College); Amy Greenwald (Brown University) - Modeling and Correcting Bias in Sequential Evaluation
Jingyan Wang (Georgia Institute of Technology); Ashwin Pananjady (Georgia Institute of Technology) - Incentives for Exploration at Market Equilibrium
Eren Ozbay (University of Illinois Chicago); Vijay Kamble (University of Illinois Chicago) - Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets
Battal Dogan (University of Bristol); Lars Ehlers (University of Montreal) - Fast computation of exact confidence intervals for randomized experiments with binary outcomes
P. M. Aronow (Yale University); Haoge Chang (Yale University); Patrick Lopatto (Brown University) - The Good, The Bad and The Picky: Reference Dependence and the Reversal of Product Ratings
Tommaso Bondi (Cornell University); Michelangelo Rossi (Télécom Paris, Institut Polytechnique de Paris); Ryan Stevens (Meta) - The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning
Itai Arieli (Technion); Yakov Babichenkoyako (Technion); Stephan Müller (University of Göttingen); Farzad Pourbabaee (Caltech); Omer Tamuz (Caltech) - Inference on the Optimal Assortment in the Multinomial Logit Model
Shuting Shen (Harvard University); Xi Chen (New York University); Ethan X. Fang (Duke University); Junwei Lu (Harvard University) - Equity Incentives in Networked Teams
Krishna Dasaratha (Boston University); Ben Golub (Northwestern University); Anant Shah (Northwestern University) - On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality
Diodato Ferraioli (University of Salerno); Carmine Ventre (King’s College London) - Agreements of Continuous-Time Games
Mikhail Panov (HSE Saint Petersburg) - Modeling Interference Using Experiment Roll-out
Ariel Boyarsky (Columbia Business School); Hongseok Namkoong (Columbia Business School); Jean Pouget-Abadie (Google Research) - Group fairness in dynamic refugee assignment
Daniel Freund (MIT); Thodoris Lykouris (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Elisabeth Paulson (Harvard Business School); Bradley Sturt (University of Illinois at Chicago); Wentao Weng (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) - Multi-agent Performative Prediction: From Global Stability and Optimality to Chaos
Georgios Piliouras (SUTD); Fang-Yi Yu (George Mason University) - Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections
Ran Eilat (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev); Zvika Neeman (Tel Aviv University); Eilon Solan (Tel Aviv University) - Nearly Optimal Committee Selection For Bias Minimization
Yang Cai (Yale University); Eric Xue (Princeton University) - Discovering Opportunities in New York City’s Discovery Program: Disadvantaged Students in Highly Competitive Markets
Yuri Faenza (Columbia University); Swati Gupta (Georgia Institute of Technology); Xuan Zhang (Columbia University) - Weighted EF1 Allocations for Indivisible Chores
Xiaowei Wu (University of Macau); Cong Zhang (University of Macau); Shengwei Zhou (University of Macau) - Fair allocation in graphs
Giorgos Christodoulou (Aristotle University of Thessaloniki); Amos Fiat (Tel Aviv University); Elias Koutsoupias (University of Oxford); Alkmini Sgouritsa (University of Liverpool) - Taxing Externalities Without Hurting the Poor
Mallesh Pai (Rice University); Philipp Strack (Yale University) - Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment
Andrew Kloosterman (University of Virginia); Peter Troyan (University of Virginia) - Comparing Screening Devices
Mohammad Akbarpour (Stanford University); Piotr Dworczak (Northwestern University); Frank Yang (Stanford University) - Alone, Together: A Model of Social (Mis)Learning from Consumer Reviews
Tommaso Bondi (Cornell University) - Blockchain Mediated Persuasion
Kimon Drakopoulos (USC); Irene Lo (Stanford University); Justin Mulvany (USC) - Information Design of Online Platforms
T. Tony Ke (Chinese University of Hong Kong); Song Lin (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology); Michelle Y. Lu (China Europe International Business School) - Capacity Planning in Stable Matching: An Application to School Choice
Federico Bobbio (University of Montreal); Margarida Carvalho (University of Montreal); Andrea Lodi (Jacobs Technion-Cornell Institute, Cornell Tech); Ignacio Rios (The University of Texas at Dallas); Alfredo Torrico (Polytechnique Montreal) - Liquid Welfare guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions
Giannis Fikioris (Cornell University); Eva Tardos (Cornell University) - A Nonparametric Framework for Online Stochastic Matching with Correlated Arrivals
Ali Aouad (London Business School); Will Ma (Columbia University) - Predicting Choice from Information Costs
Elliot Lipnowski (Columbia); Doron Ravid (University of Chicago) - Algorithmic Assistance with Recommendation-Dependent Preferences
Bryce McLaughlin (Stanford University); Jann Spiess (Stanford University) - Algorithms and Complexity for Computing Nash Equilibria in Adversarial Team Games
Ioannis Anagnostides (Carnegie Mellon University); Fivos Kalogiannis (University of California, Irvine); Ioannis Panageas (UC Irvine); Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis (UC Berkeley); Stephen McAleer (Carnegie Mellon University) - Best-Response Dynamics in Lottery Contests
Abheek Ghosh (Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford); Paul W. Goldberg (Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford) - The Privacy Elasticity of Behavior: Conceptualization and Application
Inbal Dekel (Hebrew University); Rachel Cummings (Columbia University); Ori Heffetz (Hebrew University and Cornell University); Katrina Ligett (Hebrew University) - Persuasion with Hard and Soft Information
Sulagna Dasgupta (University of Chicago, Department of Economics) - Complexity of equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs
Max Klimm (Technische Universität Berlin); Maximilian J. Stahlberg (Technische Universität Berlin) - Regret and Information Avoidance
Zichang Wang (Duke University) - Graph Ranking and the Cost of Sybil Defense
Gwendolyn Farach-Colton (Rutgers University); Martin Farach-Colton (Rutgers University); Leslie Ann Goldberg (University of Oxford); Hanna Komlos (Rutgers University); John Lapinskas (Bristol University); Reut Levi (Reichman University); Moti Medina (Bar Ilan University); Miguel A. Mosteiro (Pace University) - On picking sequences for chores
Uriel Feige (Weizmann Institute of Science); Xin Huang (Technion) - Pollution Permits: Efficiency by Design
Marek Pycia (University of Zurich); Kyle Woodward (Gopuff) - Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting
Markus Brill (University of Warwick); Jannik Peters (Technische Universität Berlin) - Optimal Test Design for Knowledge-based Screening
Sulagna Dasgupta (University of Chicago, Department of Economics) - Smoothed Analysis of Online Non-parametric Auctions
Naveen Durvasula (UC Berkeley); Nika Haghtalab (UC Berkeley); Manolis Zampetakis (UC Berkeley) - Centralized Versus Decentralized Pricing Controls for Dynamic Matching Platforms
Ali Aouad (London Business School); Omer Saritac (London Business School); Chiwei Yan (University of Washington) - Regret Minimization with Noisy Observations
Mohammad Mahdian (Google Research); Jieming Mao (Google Research); Kangning Wang (Stanford University) - Help and Haggle: Social Commerce Through Randomized, All-or-Nothing Discounts
Luyi Yang (The University of California, Berkeley, Haas School of Business); Chen Jin (National University of Singapore); Zhen Shao (The University of Science and Technology of China) - The Wisdom of the Crowd and Higher-Order Beliefs
Yi-Chun Chen (National University of Singapore); Manuel Mueller-Frank (IESE Business School, University of Navarra); Mallesh Pai (Rice University) - Axiomatization of Random Utility Model with Unobservable Alternatives
kota saito (caltech HSS); alec sandroni (caltech); kono haruki (MIT economics) - Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcomes
Matteo Castiglioni (Politecnico di Milano); Alberto Marchesi (Politecnico di Milano); Nicola Gatti (Politecnico di Milano) - The Power of Greedy for Online Minimum Cost Matching on the Line
Eric Balkanski (Columbia University); Yuri Faenza (Columbia University); Noémie Périvier (Columbia University) - Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts
Tal Alon (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology); Paul Duetting (Google Research); Yingkai Li (Yale University); Inbal Talgam-Cohen (Technion – Israel Institute of Technology) - Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria
Georgios Amanatidis (University of Essex); Georgios Birmpas (Sapienza University of Rome); Philip Lazos (IOHK); Stefano Leonardi (Sapienza University of Rome); Rebecca Reiffenhäuser (University of Amsterdam) - Feature Based Dynamic Matching
Yilun Chen (School of Data Science, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen); Yash Kanoria (Columbia Business School); Akshit Kumar (Columbia Business School); Wenxin Zhang (Columbia Business School) - Matchings Witness Candidates in the Generalized Veto Core: A Practical Voting Rule with Optimal Metric Distortion
Fatih Kizilkaya (University of Southern California); David Kempe (University of Southern California) - EFX: A Simpler Approach and an (Almost) Optimal Guarantee via Rainbow Cycle Number
Hannaneh Akrami (Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Graduate school of Saarland University); Noga Alon (Princeton University); Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Jugal Garg (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign); Kurt Mehlhorn (MPI for Informatics); Ruta Mehta (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) - Royal Processions: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-Sided Matching
Joseph Root (University of Chicago); Sophie Bade (Royal Holloway) - Side-Constrained Dynamic Traffic Equilibria
Lukas Graf (University of Passau); Tobias Harks (University of Passau) - I’ll Tell You Tomorrow: Committing to Future Commitments
Andrew Bongjune Choi (University of Chicago) - Online Resource Allocation with Buyback: Optimal Algorithms via Primal-Dual
Farbod Ekbatani (University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Yiding Feng (Microsoft Research); Rad Niazadeh (University of Chicago Booth School of Business) - Dynamic Concern for Misspecification
Giacomo Lanzani (Massachusetts Institute Technology) - Re-examining Moral Hazard under Inattention: New Evidence from Behavioral Data in Auto Insurance
Yizhou Jin (University of Toronto) - Should the Timing of Inspections be Predictable?
Ian Ball (MIT); Jan Knoepfle (Queen Mary University of London) - Managed Campaigns and Data-Augmented Auctions for Digital Advertising
Dirk Bergemann (Yale); Alessandro Bonatti (MIT Sloan); Nicholas Wu (Yale) - Communication Protocols under Transparent Motives
Roberto Corrao (MIT); Yifan Dai (MIT) - Practical algorithms and experimentally validated incentives for equilibrium-based fair division (A-CEEI)
Eric Budish (University of Chicago); Ruiquan Gao (Stanford University); Abraham Othman (University of Pennsylvania); Aviad Rubinstein (Stanford University); Qianfan Zhang (Princeton University) - Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees
Shahar Dobzinski (Weizmann); Sigal Oren (Ben-Gurion University); Jan Vondrak (Stanford University) - Playing Divide-and-Choose Given Uncertain Preferences
Jamie Tucker-Foltz (Harvard University); Richard Zeckhauser (Harvard University) - The Computational Complexity of Multi-player Concave Games and Kakutani Fixed Points
Christos Papadimitriou (Columbia University); Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis (UC Berkeley); Manolis Zampetakis (UC Berkeley) - Trading Prophets
Paul Duetting (Google Research); Jan Olkowski (University of Maryland, College Park, MD, USA); Jose Correa (Universidad de Chile); Andrés Cristi (Universidad de Chile); Kevin Schewior (University of Southern Denmark); MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi (University of Maryland) - You Can Have Your Cake and Redistrict It Too
Gerdus Benade (Boston University); Ariel D. Procaccia (Harvard University); Jamie Tucker-Foltz (Harvard University) - Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World
Andreas Kleiner (Arizona State University) - Chunking Tasks for Present-Biased Agents
Joseph Halpern (Cornell University); Aditya Saraf (Cornell University) - In Defense of Liquid Democracy
Daniel Halpern (Harvard University); Joseph Halpern (Cornell University); Ali Jadbabaie (MIT); Elchanan Mossel (MIT); Ariel Procaccia (Harvard University); Manon Revel (MIT, Harvard University) - Fundamental Bounds on Online Strategic Classification
Saba Ahmadi (Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago); Avrim Blum (Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago); Kunhe Yang (University of California, Berkeley) - On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings
Moshe Babaioff (Microsoft Research); Shahar Dobzinski (Weizmann Institute of Science); Shiri Ron (Weizmann Institute of Science) - Correlated Cluster-Based Randomized Experiments: Robust Variance Minimization
Ozan Candogan (University of Chicago Booth School of Business); Chen Chen (New York University Shanghai); Rad Niazadeh (University of Chicago Booth School of Business)