Note, if you are attending EC in virtually, consult instead the Virtual Schedule.
| July 9, 08:00-08:30 |
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| Breakfast; Great Hall |
| July 9, 08:30-09:30 | ||
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| EC@EC W; Room K0.16 | GIW; Room K0.31 | Market Design W; River Room |
| Approximating Equilibrium under Constrained Piecewise Linear Concave Utilities with Applications to Matching Markets László VéghPPAD-membership for Problems with Exact Rational Solutions: A General Approach via Convex Optimization Kristoffer A. Hansen |
Mechanism Design: Toward a Positive Social Impact Kira Goldner |
Employees versus Contractors: An Operational Perspective Ilan LobelStrategic Decentralized Matching: The Effects of Information Frictions Leeat Yariv |
| July 9, 09:30-10:00 |
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| Coffee; Great Hall |
| July 9, 10:00-11:00 | ||
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| EC@EC W; Room K0.16 | GIW; Anatomy Museum | Market Design W; River Room |
| A Smoothed FPTAS for Equilibria in Congestion Games Yiannis GiannakopoulosComputing better approximate pure Nash equilibria in cut games via semidefinite programming Ioannis Caragiannis |
Platform Design, Self-Preferencing, and Dynamic Competition on Amazon Olivia HartzellConstant Approximation for Auctions with Private Interdependent Valuations Divyarthi MohanHolding Accountability Metrics Accountable: How Counterfactuals Can Improve Incentives Serena Wang |
Quality and Externalities on Platforms Peter ColesLearning Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Auction Games Martin Bichler |
| July 9, 11:00-11:30 |
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| Coffee; Great Hall |
| July 9, 11:30-12:30 |
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| Keynote; Safra with overflow in Anatomy Lecture Theater; Chair: Larry Samuelson |
| Social Connectedness and Information Markets Rachel Kranton |
| July 9, 12:30-14:00 |
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| Lunch; Great Hall |
| July 9, 14:00-15:00 | ||||
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| Track A; Room K0.16 | Track B; River Room | Track C; Anatomy Museum | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater | Track E; Safra |
| Econometrics, ML, and data science; Online platforms and applications
Chair: Kevin Leyton-Brown Correlated Cluster-Based Randomized Experiments: Robust Variance Minimization Deep Learning Based Causal Inference for Large-Scale Combinatorial Experiments: Theory and Empirical Evidence Reducing Marketplace Interference Bias Via Shadow Prices |
Online Algorithms, Learning, and Decision Making
Chair: Thodoris Lykouris Single-Leg Revenue Management with Advice Prophet Secretary Against the Online Optimal Multi-Item Order Fulfillment Revisited: LP Formulation and Prophet Inequality |
Auctions and pricing
Chair: Carmine Ventre Pricing Optimal Outcomes in Coupled and Non-Convex Markets: Theory and Applications to Electricity Markets Robust Pseudo-Markets for Reusable Public Resources Pollution Permits: Efficiency by Design |
Information design; Mechanism design
Chair: Teddy Mekonnen Prizes and effort in contests with private information Information Design of a Delegated Search |
Fair division
Chair: Biaoshuai Tao Fair Multiwinner Elections with Allocation Constraints Playing Divide-and-Choose Given Uncertain Preferences You Can Have Your Cake and Redistrict It Too |
| July 9, 15:00-15:30 |
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| Tea and Contributed Posters; Great Hall |
| July 9, 15:30-16:30 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Track A; Room K0.16 | Track B; River Room | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater |
| Mechanism design
Chair: Mete Şeref Ahunbay Equity Pay in Networked Teams Fairness and Incentive Compatibility via Percentage Fees Taxing Externalities Without Hurting the Poor |
Online Algorithms, Learning, and Decision Making
Chair: Laura Doval Liquid Welfare Guarantees for No-Regret Learning in Sequential Budgeted Auctions Smoothed Analysis of Online Non-parametric Auctions Regret Minimization with Noisy Observations |
Market design & matching markets
Chair: Tomer Ezra Principal Trading Arrangements: Optimality under Temporary and Permanent Price Impact Efficient Market Design with Distributional Objectives The Power of Greedy for Online Minimum Cost Matching on the Line |
| July 9, 16:30-17:00 |
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| Tea and Contributed Posters; Great Hall |
| July 9, 17:00-18:00 | ||
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| Track B; River Room | Track C; Anatomy Museum | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater |
| Equilibria, learning, and dynamics in games
Chair: Vijay Kamble Causal Estimation of User Learning in Personalized Systems Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections Universally Robust Information Aggregation for Binary Decisions |
Fair division
Chair: Yair Zick A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria Guaranteeing Envy-Freeness under Generalized Assignment Constraints |
Auctions and pricing; Mechanism design; Information design; Online Algorithms, Learning, and Decision Making; Contract design
Chair: Michael Albert Purchase History and Product Personalization Pricing Novel Goods Prophet Inequalities over Time |
| July 9, 18:00 |
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| Welcome Reception; River Terrace |
| July 10, 08:00-08:30 |
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| Breakfast; Great Hall |
| July 10, 08:30-09:30 | ||
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| EC@EC W; Room K0.16 | GIW; Anatomy Museum | Market Design W; Anatomy Lecture Theater |
| Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers Denizalp GoktasStochastic Online Fisher Markets: Static Pricing Limits and Adaptive Enhancements Devansh Jalota |
Women’s Breakfast (Starts at 08:00) Sponsored by Meta |
Auctions Between Regret-Minimizing Agents Noam Nisan |
| July 10, 09:30-10:00 |
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| Coffee; Great Hall |
| July 10, 10:00-11:00 |
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| Joint Workshop Poster Session; Great Hall |
| July 10, 11:00-11:30 |
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| Coffee; Great Hall |
| July 10, 11:30-12:30 |
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| SIG Awards; Safra with overflow in Anatomy Lecture Theater; Chairs: Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren |
| [Dissertation] Complexity in Economic Theory Modibo Camara[Text of Time] Marriage, honesty, and stability Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian[Test of Time] Unbalanced random matching markets Itai Ashlagi, Yash Kanoria, Jacob D. Leshno |
| July 10, 12:30-14:00 |
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| Lunch; Great Hall |
| July 10, 14:00-15:00 | ||||
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| Track A; Room K0.16 | Track B; River Room | Track C; Anatomy Museum | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater | Track E; Safra |
| Blockchain and cryptocurrencies
Chair: Francisco Marmolejo-Cossío Blockchain Mediated Persuasion Axioms for Constant Function Market Makers Finding the Right Curve: Optimal Design of Constant Function Market Makers |
Econometrics, ML, and data science
Chair: Fanyin Zheng Estimating Effects of Long-Term Treatments Combinatorial Inference on the Optimal Assortment in the Multinomial Logit Model On the Timing of Auctions: The Effects of Complementarities on Bidding, Participation, and Welfare |
Online Algorithms, Learning, and Decision Making
Chair: Riccardo Colini Baldeschi Trading Prophets Allocating with Priorities and Quotas: Algorithms, Complexity, and Dynamics Fundamental Bounds on Online Strategic Classification |
Behavioral economics and bounded rationality
Chair: Sigal Oren A Measure of Complexity for Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Re-examining Moral Hazard under Inattention: New Evidence from Behavioral Data in Auto Insurance Algorithmic Assistance with Recommendation-Dependent Preferences |
Mechanism design; Social choice & voting theory
Chair: Ioannis Caragiannis Balanced Donor Coordination Distortion in metric matching with ordinal preferences Improved Bounds for Single-Nomination Impartial Selection |
| July 10, 15:00-15:30 |
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| Tea and Contributed Posters; Great Hall |
| July 10, 15:30-16:30 | |||
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| Track A; Room K0.16 | Track B; River Room | Track C; Anatomy Museum | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater |
| Contract design
Chair: Ian Ball Quantum Information Elicitation Multi-Agent Contract Design: How to Commission Multiple Agents with Individual Outcomes Bayesian Analysis of Linear Contracts |
Auctions and pricing; Econometrics, ML, and data science
Chair: Omar Besbes Temporal Fairness in Learning and Earning: Price Protection Guarantee and Phase Transitions The Impact of Privacy Protection on Online Advertising Markets Strong Revenue (Non-)Monotonicity of Single-parameter Auctions |
Social choice & voting theory
Chair: David Kempe Best of Both Distortion Worlds Distortion Under Public-Spirited Voting The Wisdom of Strategic Voting |
Market design & matching markets
Chair: Nick Arnosti Interviewing Matching in Random Markets Welfare Distribution in Two-sided Random Matching Markets |
| July 10, 16:30-17:00 |
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| Tea and Contributed Posters; Great Hall |
| July 10, 17:00-18:00 | |||
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| Track A; Room K0.16 | Track B; River Room | Track C; Anatomy Museum | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater |
| Behavioral economics and bounded rationality
Chair: James Wright Chunking Tasks for Present-Biased Agents The Good, The Bad and The Picky: Reference Dependence and the Reversal of Product Ratings |
Auctions and pricing; Mechanism design; Online platforms and applications
Chair: Benjamin Lubin Online Resource Allocation with Buyback: Optimal Algorithms via Primal-Dual Incentive Compatibility in the Auto-bidding World Managed Campaigns and Data-Augmented Auctions for Digital Advertising |
Equilibria, learning, and dynamics in games
Chair: Elliot Lipnowski Communication via hard and soft information Informationally Robust Cheap-Talk Withholding Verifiable Information |
Fair division
Chair: Martin Hoefer Fair allocation in graphs A General Framework for Fair Allocation under Matroid Rank Valuations Equitable stable matchings under modular assessment |
| July 10, 18:00 |
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| Town Hall; Safra; Chair: Nicole Immorlica |
| July 11, 08:00-08:30 |
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| Breakfast; Great Hall |
| July 11, 08:30-09:30 | |||
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| EC@EC W; Room K0.16 | GIW; Anatomy Museum | Market Design W; Anatomy Lecture Theater | Mentoring W; Great Hall |
| Pure-Circuit: Strong Inapproximability for PPAD John FearnleyA Computational Viewpoint on Financial Networks with Derivatives Stavros Ioannidis |
Fairness in Resource Allocation Swati Gupta |
Redesigning Volunteer Match’s Ranking Algorithm: Toward More Equitable Access to Volunteers Vahideh ManshadiRedesigning Framework Agreement Auctions in Chile Reduces Government Spending Daniela Saban |
Graduating Bits Poster Session |
| July 11, 09:30-10:00 |
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| Coffee and Graduating Bits Poster Session; Great Hall |
| July 11, 10:00-11:00 | |||
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| EC@EC W; Room K0.16 | GIW; Anatomy Museum | Market Design W; Anatomy Lecture Theater | Mentoring W; Great Hall |
| The Complexity of Pacing for Second-Price Auctions Rachitesh KumarComplexity of Equilibria in First-Price Auctions under General Tie-Breaking Rules Binghui Peng |
Visualizing our values: understanding the impact of constraints on algorithmic decision-making Jessie FinocchiaroEpidemics prediction and control: insights from network analysis Yeganeh AlimohammadiUnderstanding and Improving Evaluation: Algorithms, People, and Design Jingyan Wang |
Differentiable economics: Using deep learning to discover new market designs David C. Parkes |
Graduating Bits Poster Session |
| July 11, 11:00-11:30 |
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| Coffee and Graduating Bits Poster Session; Great Hall |
| July 11, 11:30-12:30 |
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| Keynote; Safra with overflow in Anatomy Lecture Theater; Chair: Jason Hartline |
| Fairness in multiwinner voting Edith Elkind |
| July 11, 12:30-14:00 |
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| Lunch; Great Hall |
| July 11, 14:00-15:00 | ||||
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| Track A; Room K0.16 | Track B; River Room | Track C; Anatomy Museum | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater | Track E; Safra |
| Equilibria, learning, and dynamics in games
Chair: Matheus V.X. Ferreira Computing Bayes Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual Averaging Best-Response Dynamics in Lottery Contests Agreements of Continuous-Time Games |
Econometrics, ML, and data science; Economics of Algorithms; Equilibria, learning, and dynamics in games; Social networks and social learning
Chair: Simina Brânzei Graphon Games with Multiple Equilibria: Analysis and Computation Graph Ranking and the Cost of Sybil Defense Modeling Interference Using Experiment Roll-out |
Online platforms and applications; Online Algorithms, Learning, and Decision Making
Chair: Yeganeh Alimohammadi Alone, Together: A Model of Social (Mis)Learning from Consumer Reviews Adwords with Unknown Budgets and Beyond Order-optimal Correlated Rounding for Fulfilling Multi-item E-commerce Orders |
Mechanism design; Contract design
Chair: Kira Goldner Should the Timing of Inspections be Predictable? Ambiguous Contracts Optimal Delegation in a Multidimensional World |
Fair division
Chair: Aris Filos-Ratsikas EFX: A Simpler Approach and an (Almost) Optimal Guarantee via Rainbow Cycle Number Weighted EF1 Allocations for Indivisible Chores On picking sequences for chores |
| July 11, 15:00-15:30 |
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| Tea and Contributed Posters; Great Hall |
| July 11, 15:30-16:30 | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Track A; Room K0.16 | Track B; River Room | Track C; Anatomy Museum | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater |
| Equilibria, learning, and dynamics in games; Online Algorithms, Learning, and Decision Making
Chair: Ioannis Panageas Multi-agent Performative Prediction: From Global Stability and Optimality to Chaos Agreement Implies Accuracy for Substitutable Signals No-Regret Learning in Games is Turing Complete |
Social choice & voting theory
Chair: Lirong Xia Robust and Verifiable Proportionality Axioms for Multiwinner Voting Nearly Optimal Committee Selection For Bias Minimization Generalized Veto Core and a Practical Voting Rule with Optimal Metric Distortion |
Market design & matching markets
Chair: Irene Lo Capacity Planning in Stable Matching: An Application to School Choice Superiority of Instantaneous Decisions in Thin Dynamic Matching Markets Discovering Opportunities in New York City’s Discovery Program: Disadvantaged Students in Highly Competitive Markets |
Auctions and pricing; Mechanism design
Chair: Liad Blumrosen Fine-Grained Buy-Many Mechanisms Are Not Much Better Than Bundling Robust Auction Design with Support Information |
| July 11, 16:30-17:00 |
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| Tea and Contributed Posters; Great Hall |
| July 11, 17:00-18:00 | |||
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| Track A; Room K0.16 | Track B; River Room | Track C; Anatomy Museum | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater |
| Privacy, algorithmic fairness, social good, and ethics
Chair: Modibo Camara Which Lp norm is the fairest? Approximations for fair facility location across all “p” Group fairness in dynamic refugee assignment The Privacy Elasticity of Behavior: Conceptualization and Application |
Social networks and social learning
Chair: Rachel Kranton The Hazards and Benefits of Condescension in Social Learning Corporate Culture and Organizational Fragility In Defense of Liquid Democracy |
Market design & matching markets; Behavioral economics and bounded rationality
Chair: Kyle Woodward Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions Rankings-Dependent Preferences: A Real Goods Matching Experiment Confidence and College Applications: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention |
Mechanism design; Online Algorithms, Learning, and Decision Making
Chair: Zhiyi Huang Pandora’s Problem with Combinatorial Cost Tightness without Counterexamples: A New Approach and New Results for Prophet Inequalities Description Complexity of Regular Distributions |
| July 11, 18:00 |
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| Banquet; Bush House, 8th Floor
Meet in King’s courtyard at 18:00 or use Bush House Central entrance, Kingsway |
| July 12, 08:00-08:30 |
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| Breakfast; Great Hall |
| July 12, 08:30-09:30 |
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| Best Papers; Safra with overflow in Anatomy Lecture Theater; Chair: Larry Samuelson |
| [Best Paper] Which Wage Distributions are Consistent with Statistical Discrimination? Rahul Deb, Ludavic Renou[Best Student/Exemplary Theory Paper] Dynamic Concern for Misspecification Giacomo Lanzani |
| July 12, 09:30-10:00 |
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| Coffee; Great Hall |
| July 12, 10:00-11:00 |
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| Exemplary Track; Safra with overflow in Anatomy Lecture Theater; Chair: Jason Hartline |
| [Applied Modeling] Welfare-Maximizing Pooled Testing Simon Finster, Michelle González Amador, Edwin Lock Francisco Marmolejo Cossio, Evi Micha, Ariel Procaccia[AI] Leveraging Reviews: Learning to Price with Buyer and Seller Uncertainty Wenshuo Guo, Nika Haghtalab, Kirthevasan Kandasamy, Ellen Vitercik[Empirics] Choice Architecture, Privacy Valuations, and Selection Bias Tesary Lin, Avner Strulov-Shlain |
| July 12, 11:00-11:30 |
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| Coffee; Great Hall |
| July 12, 11:30-12:30 |
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| SIG Awards; Safra with overflow in Anatomy Lecture Theater; Chairs: Kevin Leyton-Brown, Éva Tardos |
| [Mid-career] Approximation is the new optimal Michal Feldman[Mid-career] Shopkeeping bandits: Twenty years of research on learning and dynamic pricing Robert D. Kleinberg[Lifetime Achievement] Algorithmic Mechanism Design: The core problem that “stuck” Noam Nisan[Lifetime Achievement] Brief remarks Christos H. Papadimitriou |
| July 12, 12:30-14:00 |
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| Lunch; Great Hall |
| July 12, 14:00-15:00 | |||
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| Track A; Council Room | Track B; River Room | Track C; Anatomy Museum | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater |
| Equilibrium computation and complexity; Equilibria, learning, and dynamics in games
Chair: Edith Elkind Side-Constrained Dynamic Traffic Equilibria Robust Stackelberg Equilibria Algorithms and Complexity for Computing Nash Equilibria in Adversarial Team Games |
Mechanism design
Chair: Bart de Keijzer Optimal Test Design for Knowledge-based Screening Delegating to Multiple Agents Comparison of Screening Devices |
Market design & matching markets; Online platforms and applications
Chair: Brendan Lucier Centralized Versus Decentralized Pricing Controls for Dynamic Matching Platforms Targeting versus Competition in Marketplace Design: Evidence from Geotargeted Internet Ads Incentives for Exploration at Market Equilibrium |
Contract design
Chair: Sam Taggart Robust Contracts: A Revealed Preference Approach The Power of Menus in Contract Design The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Design |
| July 12, 15:00-15:30 |
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| Tea and Contributed Posters; Great Hall |
| July 12, 15:30-16:30 | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Track A; Council Room | Track B; River Room | Track C; Anatomy Museum | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater | Track E; Safra |
| Crowdsourcing and information elicitation
Chair: Jessie Finocchiaro Modeling and Correcting Bias in Sequential Evaluation Measurement Integrity in Peer Prediction: A Peer Assessment Case Study The Wisdom of the Crowd and Higher-Order Beliefs |
Decision theory
Chair: Alexandros Psomas Predicting Choice from Information Costs Axiomatization of Random Utility Model with Unobservable Alternatives Regret and Information Avoidance |
Equilibrium computation and complexity; Market equilibria
Chair: Rad Niazadeh Multi-Channel Auction Design in the Autobidding World Tâtonnement in Homothetic Fisher Markets Practical algorithms and experimentally validated incentives for equilibrium-based fair division (A-CEEI) |
Market design & matching markets; Online platforms and applications
Chair: Nima Haghpanah A Nonparametric Framework for Online Stochastic Matching with Correlated Arrivals Feature Based Dynamic Matching Information Design of Online Platforms |
Mechanism design
Chair: Paul Duetting On the Computational Complexity of Mechanism Design in Single-Crossing Settings On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality Simplicity in Auctions Revisited: The Primitive Complexity |
| July 12, 16:30-17:00 |
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| Tea and Contributed Posters; Great Hall |
| July 12, 17:00-18:00 | ||
|---|---|---|
| Track B; River Room | Track C; Anatomy Museum | Track D; Anatomy Lecture Theater |
| Equilibrium computation and complexity
Chair: Alexandros Hollender Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation Complexity of equilibria in binary public goods games on undirected graphs The Computational Complexity of Multi-player Concave Games and Kakutani Fixed Points |
Online platforms and applications
Chair: David Pennock Signaling Competition in Two-Sided Markets Help and Haggle: Social Commerce Through Randomized, All-or-Nothing Discounts |
Social choice & voting theory
Chair: Paul Goelz The Impact of a Coalition: Assessing the Likelihood of Voter Influence in Large Elections A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice Mechanisms Royal Processions: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-Sided Matching |
| July 12, 18:00 |
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| Adjourn; London |